Saturday, March 21, 2020

Collision of Two Monorails in Walt Disney World Resort

Introduction At approximately 2.00 am 5th July, 2009, an accident occurred at the Walt Disney Resort. It involved a collision of two monorails that were moving on the Epcot beam, next to the Concourse station in Lake Buena Vista, Florida. The accident took place after one of the monorails (the Pink monorail) reversed via an improperly aligned-beam, in effect hitting the Purple monorail (National Transportation Safety Board 2). Although the six passengers did not sustain any injuries, the operator was seriously injured and he later died.Advertising We will write a custom term paper sample on Collision of Two Monorails in Walt Disney World Resort specifically for you for only $16.05 $11/page Learn More On the other hand, the Purple monorail only had the operator as the sole occupant. He was rushed to hospital and upon examination, was discharged (National Transportation Safety Board 2). At the time of the accident the weather was very clear. The damage as a result of the monorail accident was estimated to have amounted to $ 24 million. Cause of the accident The federal investigators who were commissioned to initiate a probe into the probable cause of the monorail accident reported that lack of sufficient safety protocols may have contributed to the occurrence of the two monorails in Walt Disney Resort. These investigations were conducted for almost two-and-a-half years. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) released a 14-page report on the accident, in which a couple of employee errors were highlighted as the main causes of the accident (National Transportation Safety Board para. 1). This report appears to somewhat contradict with the investigations conducted by the federal government investigators, who noted faulted the lack of standard operating schedules at the Walt Disney World Resort, arguing that this could have played a significant role in establishing an unsafe environment, in effect causing the accident when the tr ain reversed and hit the other one. How the monorail system in Disney World works There are two areas set aside to facilitate servicing of the monorails in Disney World. The first designated area is referred to as the Epcot, while the second designated area is referred to as Magic Kingdom Park. On the one hand, the Magic Kingdom Park service area is made up of two monorail beams. The two monorail beams run parallel, effectively forming a complete loop (National Transportation Safety Board 4). The Express beam is on the outside, while the Lagoon/Resort beam is on the inside. On the other hand, the Epcot service area is made up of the Epcot beam. The Epcot beam has also formed a complete loop.Advertising Looking for term paper on business economics? Let's see if we can help you! Get your first paper with 15% OFF Learn More When the accident took place, there were a total of five monorails operating at the Walt Disney Resort and they were identified the Purple, Pink, Red , Coral, and Silver colors (National Transportation Safety Board 6). A spur beam acts as a link between the two service areas. Switch beam 9 lies at one end of the spur-beam, while switch-beam 8 lies at the other end. If you want a monorail to move from one beam to another, all you have to do is reposition them accordingly. The closure of the Magic Kingdom Park does prevent the monorails from undertaking their duties as there is a time allowance allocated to facilitate this. By and large, the Express beam monorails may operate for about an hour once the park has closed. After 3 hours following the closing of the park, the monorails on the Resort beam can no longer work, and this have to be returned for nightly maintenance at the mechanical facility via the Express beam. When this particular accident took place, three monorails were operating on the Epcot beam. They include the Purple, Pink, and Coral monorails. Because all the passengers had already disembarked from the Pink monorai l, it was directed to the Express beam first so that it could be serviced overnight. It is important to note that the Pink monorail could have only accessed the mechanical facility via the Express beam. At approximately, 1.53 am., the central coordinator of the monorail issues instructions to the Pink monorail operator to enable him get onto the Express beam and back to the mechanical facility. However, the Pink monorail did not stop until it had moved beyond the switch-beam 9. That is when the operator communicated with the central operator and told him that switch-beam 9 had been cleared. This prompted the central coordinator to get in touch with the shop panel operator so that he could line â€Å"switch-beams 8 and 9 to the spur-line with power† (National Transportation Safety board, 2009). Power was then switched from the Epcot beam to facilitate the switch-beam realignment. Upon conducting further investigations, the National Transportation Safety Board concluded that th e shop panel operator may have failed to position switch-beam 9 properly, and this could have led to the collision. The board also took issues with the monorail manager who is supposed to play the role of a central coordinator in determining the position of switch-beam 9 prior to authorizing the driver of the Pink monorail to reverse. The investigations further revealed that once the operators had switched off power to the beam, there was no prompt initiation of the switch-beam realignment. The shop panel operator received a call from the operator of the Silver monorail at 1:55 Am., so that he could be guided while entering the mechanical facility. At 1:56 Am., the shop panel operator received another call from the Red monorail operator who also wished to enter the facility but he was requested to first hold at a given location (Orlando Business Journal para. 4).Advertising We will write a custom term paper sample on Collision of Two Monorails in Walt Disney World Resort specif ically for you for only $16.05 $11/page Learn More During the interrogation, the shop panel operator told the investigator that the reason why he switched on power to the Epcot beam was because according to his understanding, there was proper alignment of the switch-beam. At 1:57 Am., the Pink monorail operator was given the clearance to reverse by the central coordinator, having been informed by the shop panel operator that â€Å"Switch-beams 8 and 9 are on the spur-line with power† (National Transportation Safety Board 6). When the operator of the Pink monorail started to reverse, switch-beams 9 and 8 were yet to be repositioned and as a result, he ended up colliding on the Epcot beam. It is important to note that the Pink monorail was previously travelling on the Epcot beam, and the Purple monorail was also following the same beam. Verdict of the investigators The National Transportation Safety Board has also taken issue with Walt Disney over the a ccidents on three fronts. According to the investigations, employees from the World Resort are not obliged to observe specific operating guide. This means that monorail drivers are not obliged to shift to the back cab first before they can drive in reverse. This way, they are in a position to drive the trains in a ‘forward-facing’ position (National Transportation Safety Board 8). Moreover, the investigator noted that the management at Disney World had not implemented a rule that would ensure that the central coordinator did not leave the central tower. At the tower, there is an emergency shutdown switch and a grid that shows the alignment of all the monorail beams and as such, the central operator would have been in a position to prevent the collision had he been at the control tower when the collision occurred. Finally, there were no procedures at the resort that demanded monorail shop operators to certify that indeed the beam had already been aligned once they had ac tivated the switch command (National Transportation Safety Board 9). Although there are video monitors at the shop that enables the shop operators to view the positions of the switch beams, nonetheless, the shop operators informed the investigators that they mainly used the monitors when they needed to determine if there was any train on the beam prior to activating the switch, as opposed to certifying if there had been a realignment of the track once the command had been entered.Advertising Looking for term paper on business economics? Let's see if we can help you! Get your first paper with 15% OFF Learn More Conclusion Investigations into the collision of two monorails at Walt Disney Resort confirmed that the accident took place due to the failure by poor operating procedures by the personnel in-charge of the monorail maintenance shop that is charged with the responsibility of controlling the switches at the track system. Also, investigations revealed that at the time of the accident, the central operator had left the central tower and as such, he could not have been able to manage the accident promptly. From the control tower, the monorail systems coordinator would have been in a better position to detect that there was an improper alignment of the track system, and this could have prevented the collision. Works Cited National Transportation Safety Board.2009. Railroad Accident Brief. 2009. Web. https://www.ntsb.gov/Pages/default.aspx National Transportation Safety Board. 2011. NTSB releases final report on 2009  monorail collision at Walt Disney World. 2011. Web. Orlando Business Jo urnal. 2011. NTSB issues report on Disney monorail crash. Web. This term paper on Collision of Two Monorails in Walt Disney World Resort was written and submitted by user Melanie Gordon to help you with your own studies. You are free to use it for research and reference purposes in order to write your own paper; however, you must cite it accordingly. You can donate your paper here.

Thursday, March 5, 2020

Forensics Team Essays

Forensics Team Essays Forensics Team Essay Forensics Team Essay Essay Topic: Investigative Forensics Team Name: Course: Instructor: : Date: Forensics Team The Computer Forensics Team The term forensics is associated with the use of technology and science in criminal investigations. Therefore, computer forensics refers to computer related evidence. To have a computer forensics department in an organization, a computer forensics team is a mandatory factor. The size of such teams varies proportionately with that of the organization size and the roles that the groups are expected to carry out in the organization. A small organization may require more than two specialists while larger ones may entail a bigger team to meet diverse requirements. A forensic team cannot be created and trained within a short period and therefore a lot of patience needs to be observed before effectual role execution is noted. Skilled specialists are hard to find and organizations need to develop in-house specialists or outsource specific service. The process of nurturing in-house talent can be difficult because it mandates at least one specialist to train the other team players regarding handling information technology in the organization as related to criminal issues. Therefore, specialists need to be outsourced. Caution has to be taken not to incorporate in-house information technology professionals in the creation of a forensic department. This is because the company may think it is acting on cost efficiency by averting the training overheads to other company activities; it may mean incurring further losses due to lack of impartiality on the part of the information technology staff. A computer forensic agent or specialist should not have access to any of the organizations departments, especially the IT section. An eligible candidate for the post of a forensic specialist should have a strong IT background, investigative knowledge and skills. Additionally, one should also possess a vast knowledge of a variety of forensic tec hniques, tools and arising situations. Forensics Lab Various lab tools and equipment are required to perform assorted forensic examinations. Acquisition of these tools requires a great deal of resources as well as planning time. After the team is successfully established, it shall deliberate and identify types of hardware, operating systems, software and environments they would like to analyze. Subsequently, this will enable them to determine required tools for the different roles. The laboratory should be located in a secure location away from any threat like theft of tools and equipment since the equipping factor is usually quite costly. Lab security should also be sufficient to provide less distractions and privacy during operation sessions owing to the sensitive nature of the work. A forensic workstation or two are also necessary for the lab, with the inclusion of portable equipment to support fieldwork and field exercises. As the equipment may be costly, proper comparison of prices and a cost benefit analysis should be completed to determine the best tools for desired roles. Proper licenses need to be obtained for software to avoid inconveniences. The organization should also deliberate on the need to purchase lab tools or to outsource required services from other companies, for instance by offering tenders or seeking several quotations. Regardless of the firm being an information technology organization, it is highly impossible to possess all the desired forensic tools. Tools that may prove to be too costly for the firm maybe outsourced in specific periods while affordable tools are easily purchased. Most tools require specialized operators who understand and this factor should be outsourced for cost effectuality. The organization needs to understand that the acquisition processes and analysis of computer-based evidence is hard thereby necessitating numerous amounts of resources, planning and technical expertise. Subsequently, the organization would need proper needs assessment towards determining whether to nurture in-house information technology talent or outsourcing fully qualified specialists. References Bunting, S. (2007). EnCase Computer Forensics, Includes DVD: The Official EnCE: EnCase Certified Examiner Study Guide. New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons. Solomon, M.G., Rudolph, K., Tittel, E., Broom, N., Barrett, D. (2011). Computer Forensics Jumpstart. New York, NY: John Wiley Sons.